Pressure and fragmentation
Saladin multiplies raids and limited sieges while the Crusaders must choose between defending towns, negotiating and gathering a relief army.
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The 1187 Campaign for Jerusalem
1187
Hattin destroys the field army and opens the way to the strongholds
Military history
The strategic problem
The 1187 dossier cannot be reduced to an abstract religious opposition. Saladin seeks to concentrate Ayyubid forces, control water and roads, then force the Kingdom of Jerusalem to commit its field army far from its bases. Hattin is the operational decision that leaves the strongholds vulnerable in the following months.
The march to Hattin
The Crusader army leaves a better-supplied position to reach Tiberias. Harassment, heat, smoke and lack of water gradually erode its cohesion.
Ayyubid exploitation
After Hattin, Saladin captures or secures the surrender of several strongholds, then enters Jerusalem. The surviving Crusaders no longer have enough mobile force to reverse the campaign quickly.
Explore
1 published battles, in chronological order
Military history
Sources
Near-contemporary medieval sourceIbn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh
Ayyubid chronology, the 1187 campaign, captives and consequences.
Military historyR. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193
Armies, terrain, supply and the organization of Crusader campaigns.
Critical overviewCarole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives
Muslim perspectives, Saladin’s politics and the limits of heroic narratives.
Institutional academic synthesisJoshua Prawer, Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem, trad. Gérard Nahon, tome I, chapitre IV : La bataille de Hattîn et l’année décisive
§16–18 pour le départ du 3 juillet, le Wâdî Rûmâna, Maskana, les deux routes, la perte de l’eau, la déviation vers Kafr-Hattîn et le camp entre Lûbiyâ et Kafr Maskana ; §19 pour le camp ayyoubide de Lûbiyâ et son ravitaillement ; §20 pour le plateau basaltique au pied du Nimrîn, l’attaque concentrée sur l’arrière-garde, l’arrêt, la chaleur, le vent, les incendies et la fumée ; §21 pour l’attaque de Raymond, Taqi al-Din, la fermeture du couloir, le groupe de Balian et le repli de l’infanterie.
Chronology and causal reconstruction of July 3–4, place names, water and terrain constraints, fire and smoke, and the mechanism of Raymond's breakthrough. Limited to the case of Hattin; this reference does not cover the whole conflict.
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