Battle
Warn · delay · encirclement · withdraw
Military history
From 22 to 25 April 1951, the British 29th Brigade holds a broad sector south of the Imjin to cover the US I Corps' left flank during the Chinese Spring Offensive. The night crossing, exploitation of intervals, and failed relief efforts turn battalion positions into separate pockets. The fighting costs the Glosters dearly, but the brigade's withdrawal and the halting of the Chinese offensive reveal a two-level result: local tactical loss, operational delay useful for the UN to reform its line.
The 29th Brigade is committed within I Corps' deployment as the UN advances towards the Utah and Kansas lines. Signs of a Chinese offensive exist, but its timing, axis, and strength remain uncertain. The brigade must cover a flank and preserve the possibility of withdrawal, explaining its broad front and dispersed supporting arms.
The initial deployment places the Belgian Battalion on the right, Northumberland Fusiliers in the centre, Glosters on the left, and Royal Ulster Rifles in reserve. Once Chinese forces cross the Imjin at night, they need not reduce everything frontally: gaps, communications, and routes to the rear become the principal objects of the battle.
The Chinese bridgehead south of the river, flank attacks and infiltration into the seam between the Glosters and Northumberland Fusiliers gradually isolate two Glosters companies. The hills make the position defensible, but cannot replace supply or an open ground link.
The Gloster battalion is largely destroyed or captured as a fighting formation while the brigade withdraws and reconstitutes to the south. UN forces prevent Seoul's capture and gain time to reform a line, but attributing that result to the resistance of one battalion alone would be excessive. Casualty and survivor figures vary with scope.
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Military history
HC Deb 6 June 1951, vol. 488, cc. 1012–1013, lignes 15–18 de la transcription : dispositif belge/Northumberland/Glosters/RUR, franchissement nocturne et Belges coupés ; lignes 18–23 : Glosters isolés, dégagements, repli et nouvelle ligne au sud du Han.
Initial deployment, night of 22 April, failed relief efforts, withdrawal order, and Gloster breakout groups.
View ↗Lords Hansard, 2 May 1951, lignes 15–23 : offensive et axes, Glosters isolés à Choksong, tentative philippine du 24, tentative blindée du 25, groupes de sortie et nouvelle ligne au sud du Han ; lignes 24–27 pour les pertes et l'incertitude des pertes chinoises.
Contemporary official chronology, description of isolation, and scope of casualty and survivor figures.
View ↗Page de campagne, section « CCF Spring Offensive, 22 April–8 July 1951 » : bombardement du 22 avril, franchissement de l'Imjin dans l'I Corps, retrait en lignes successives et arrêt de l'offensive avant Séoul / NO-NAME-LINE fin avril.
Operational context, campaign objectives, crossing of the Imjin, and consequence for the UN line.
View ↗PDF pp. 143–152, imprimées pp. 125–134 ; transcription HTML lignes 4649–4707, surtout p. 127 / PDF p. 145 pour la couture Glosters–Fusiliers et p. 128 / PDF p. 146 pour la colonne C-10 BCT + M 24 + Centurions arrêtée dans la gorge ; Map 8, PDF p. 147.
Sector details and relational cartographic control; composition of relief columns and development of the situation from 23 to 25 April.
View ↗Copie officielle téléchargée : pp.imprimées 385–389 (PDF 405–409) pour le dispositif ; pp.421–426 (PDF 441–446) pour les secours et sorties ; carte 34 p.423 (PDF 443), examinée entière.
Relief and spatial relationships, separation of the two routes, reserves, Belgian withdrawal, cancellation of the combined attack followed by armoured attempts, and D Company’s separate route.
View ↗Table des matières JSTOR lignes 97–132 : chapitres « Imjin: The First Day » pp. 38–53, « Second Day » pp. 54–73, « Third Day » pp. 74–93 et « Final Day » pp. 94–131 ; épilogue pp. 188–209, lignes 172–187, sur pertes, survivants et mémoire.
Academic bibliographic reference and relevant chapters; the table of contents alone is not evidence for the movements shown on the map.
View ↗Transcription de la page : lignes 71–76 pour les forces et commandements ; lignes 82–107 pour le terrain, le franchissement et l'isolement ; lignes 112–145 pour les chars, la sortie, les captures et la conséquence opérative ; lignes 140–142 pour la lettre d'Arthur Stone du 29 avril 1951.
Command of Brodie, Carne, Peng Dehuai, and Yang Dezhi; terrain, consequences, cautious casualty bounds, and relationship between memory of sacrifice and operational effect.
View ↗Page « Key Battles », entrée « Battle of Jeokseong (1951. 4. 22~25) », lignes 235–240 : 63rd Army Corps, 187th–189th Divisions, environ un quart de pertes et 39 membres du Gloster Battalion sortis.
Institutional identification of the Jeokseong/Imjin sector, Chinese units, brigade result, and order of magnitude for losses.
View ↗Photographie historique de marche du 27e corps examinée entière ; distincte des images de film du même article.
Winter theatre silhouette, with season and colours reconstructed; it does not prove the 27th Corps was present at the Imjin.
View ↗Photographie du roll call publiée dans Battle of the Imjin River, image 96524 ; vue entière de la version diffusée sur la page.
Cut of the battledress, beret, puttees and ankle boots; a generic figure with reconstructed colours.
View ↗Image 91180 publiée sur Battle of the Imjin River ; vue entière de la version diffusée sur la page.
Gun presence and silhouette of the shield and crew; a type illustration, not a reproduction of the battery.
View ↗NAM 1997-07-44-1, cuivre et laiton, fabriqué en 1923 ; récupéré dans des positions chinoises en mai 1951 ; photographie examinée entière.
Object and use of sound signals; it proves neither the precise user nor presence in a particular phase of the battle.
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