Battle
A numerically superior army taken in flank—a scenario exposed to major contingencies
Military history
Rome arrives near Cannae to regain the initiative after two major defeats; Hannibal, who has just seized a Roman supply depot, also seeks battle on a plain favourable to his cavalry. Polybius’s account allows the envelopment to be followed, but not as a modern operations order: the exact share of planned withdrawal, Roman pursuit and final collapse remains disputed.
After the Trebia and Lake Trasimene, the Senate raises the effort to eight legions, a concentration Polybius presents as exceptional. The loss of the depot at Cannae, devastation and the uncertain loyalty of some allies make delay costly without making battle inevitable.
Polybius describes maniples packed more closely and made much deeper than usual. An intention to give greater weight to the central attack is plausible; the sources do not, however, preserve the Roman explanation for this choice.
Polybius and Livy present the plain as favourable to Hannibal’s cavalry. The Aufidus borders the Roman right wing, but its course has shifted since antiquity and the precise position of the lines is not established.
Hannibal advances the Iberian-Gallic centre in a crescent and keeps the African infantry back on either side. Polybius calls them a reserve and connects this disposition with the later attack on the flanks.
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Military history
III.107 et III.110–118, en particulier 113–117 pour la bataille
Capture of the Cannae depot, Roman decision to concentrate eight legions, terrain, reported strengths, deployment, tactical sequence, casualties and first consequences.
View ↗XXII.44–59, en particulier 46–52 pour la bataille et les pertes, 54–58 pour la réaction romaine
Parallel account of terrain and fighting, survivors and camps, reported casualty totals, panic and then new levies at Rome.
View ↗XXIII.1–11, en particulier 2–7 sur Capoue et 11 sur le rapport de Mago
Political opening created by Cannae, negotiation and alliance with Capua, immediate limits of the tactical decision.
View ↗Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 47.1 (1990), p. 7–32 ; surtout p. 7–10 sur les sources et p. 21–26 sur la reconstruction
Criticism of the accounts’ reliability and biases, debates over strengths and command, constraints of the deep line, and alternative to the image of a perfectly sealed circle.
View ↗Studia Quaternaria 41.1 (2024), p. 37–42 ; surtout p. 39–40 sur la plaine, les terrasses, le déplacement du fleuve et les localisations concurrentes
Geomorphological framework, cautious cartographic reconstruction and disputed modern location of the battlefield and ancient course of the Aufidus; tactical hypotheses specific to the article are not adopted as facts.
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