Battle
A Roman column enters a concealed corridor; the vanguard’s breakout remains contained
Military history
After the Trebia, Hannibal ravages the territory of Rome’s allies to draw the consul Gaius Flaminius out before he can join the other consular army. The ancient accounts then place the Roman army on the northern shore of Lake Trasimene, in a passage bounded by water and high ground. Carthaginian forces deploy at night and wait until much of the column is committed before launching converging attacks. Mist and the corridor’s geometry fragment Roman perception; the main battle becomes a disaster, but a group of about 6,000 men breaks through the front before being pursued and captured the next day. The battlefield’s precise location, the strength of the forces and several casualty figures remain disputed.
Polybius and Livy connect the engagement with Flaminius’s pursuit of Hannibal. The Carthaginian commander ravages Rome’s allies and exploits the separation of the consular armies; the exact intention and degree of moral reconstruction are not identical in the two accounts.
The lake restricts movement to the south and high ground dominates the passage to the north. Hannibal distributes his contingents before dawn; the mist further reduces visibility. The modern location of this corridor remains a reconstruction, distinct from established cartographic fact.
The attack destroys the cohesion of most of the Roman army, but the vanguard breaks through the front. The nocturnal pursuit and surrender the next day form part of the result, as does Rome’s political response; they must not be merged into the initial clash.
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Military history
III.80–86, surtout III.83–85 pour le dispositif, le combat et la sortie des 6 000 ; III.86 pour la suite immédiate
Flaminius drawn out, choice of passage, Carthaginian deployment, converging attack, divergent losses and delayed capture of the vanguard.
View ↗XXII.3–8, surtout XXII.4–6 pour la brume, le combat et Flaminius ; XXII.7–8 pour les pertes, les 6 000, Centenius et Fabius
Version of the march without scouts, duration of about three hours, death of Flaminius, breakout and surrender the next day, and Roman consequences.
View ↗Extrait public de l’entrée : paragraphes sur l’ordre de grandeur des armées, le passage de la rive nord, la disposition des contingents, les pertes et le désaccord topographique
Modern orders of magnitude, synthesis of the ambush and bounds of the debate among proposed locations.
View ↗Frontmatter, pp. ix–x ; carte 2, p. xv ; notes annoncées à Livy 22.4.1–7.5, avec sites et positions marqués d’un point d’interrogation
Editorial framework for reading Livy, use of Lazenby’s maps and cautious visualisation of the two locations and Carthaginian groups.
View ↗Chapitre 4, pp. 67–83 ; notice et résumé publics du Research Portal de l’université de St Andrews
Methodological caution: Polybius’s account reproduces a cognitive experience of battle and is insufficient to produce a modern map by the metre.
View ↗25 août 2022, article sur la baisse du lac : obus attribués au retrait allemand de 1944 et repère examiné comme moderne ou contemporain par la Soprintendenza
Bound the use of recent finds: they do not provide archaeological proof of the location of the battle in 217 BCE.
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