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Battle

Lake Trasimene

217 BC

A Roman column enters a concealed corridor; the vanguard’s breakout remains contained

Military history

How does a marching army lose its ability to fight as an organized force?

In 217 BC, Hannibal attacks Flaminius’s army as it marches between Lake Trasimene and the hills. Mist and converging attacks prevent the Romans from forming a coherent front. Flaminius is killed. About 6,000 men escape the main battle before being pursued and captured the next day.

Before the consuls join forces

After the Trebia, Hannibal ravages Rome’s allied territories. Flaminius pursues him before joining the other consular army.

A passage dominated by high ground

The lake bounds the corridor to the south, and slopes overlook it from the north. Hannibal deploys his troops before the attack; mist further limits visibility. The exact site remains disputed.

The pursuit is part of the victory

Destroying most of the army does not settle the fate of the vanguard. Its breakthrough and surrender the following day must be distinguished from the initial ambush.

Military history

Sources

Primary sourcePolybe, Histoires, livre III

III.80–86, surtout III.83–85 pour le dispositif, le combat et la sortie des 6 000 ; III.86 pour la suite immédiate

Flaminius drawn out, choice of passage, Carthaginian deployment, converging attack, divergent losses and delayed capture of the vanguard.

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Primary sourceTite-Live, Histoire romaine, livre XXII

XXII.3–8, surtout XXII.4–6 pour la brume, le combat et Flaminius ; XXII.7–8 pour les pertes, les 6 000, Centenius et Fabius

Version of the march without scouts, duration of about three hours, death of Flaminius, breakout and surrender the next day, and Roman consequences.

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Specialised scholarly workJohn F. Lazenby, “Trasimene”, Oxford Classical Dictionary

Extrait public de l’entrée : paragraphes sur l’ordre de grandeur des armées, le passage de la rive nord, la disposition des contingents, les pertes et le désaccord topographique

Modern orders of magnitude, synthesis of the ambush and bounds of the debate among proposed locations.

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Specialised scholarly editionJohn Briscoe et Simon Hornblower (éd.), Livy: Ab urbe condita Book XXII, Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics

Frontmatter, pp. ix–x ; carte 2, p. xv ; notes annoncées à Livy 22.4.1–7.5, avec sites et positions marqués d’un point d’interrogation

Editorial framework for reading Livy, use of Lazenby’s maps and cautious visualisation of the two locations and Carthaginian groups.

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Specialised scholarly chapterNicolas Wiater, “Visualising Battle in Image and Text: Reading Kromayer against Polybius”

Chapitre 4, pp. 67–83 ; notice et résumé publics du Research Portal de l’université de St Andrews

Methodological caution: Polybius’s account reproduces a cognitive experience of battle and is insufficient to produce a modern map by the metre.

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Specialist pressANSA, “Reperti bellici e antico cippo stradale emersi dal Trasimeno”

25 août 2022, article sur la baisse du lac : obus attribués au retrait allemand de 1944 et repère examiné comme moderne ou contemporain par la Soprintendenza

Bound the use of recent finds: they do not provide archaeological proof of the location of the battle in 217 BCE.

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Edited by BattlesInMotion.com