Battle
Scipio places his Romans on the wings while the Iberian centre keeps the Africans out of the fighting
Military history
In 206 BCE, Scipio must face a numerically superior Carthaginian army without entrusting the decision to Iberian auxiliaries whose defection he fears. A cavalry attack on his camp is repulsed, then several deployments without battle reveal Hasdrubal’s order. On the decisive day, Scipio has his men eat, deploys earlier than usual and moves the legions and Italians from the centre to the wings.
Polybius gives Hasdrubal 70,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 32 elephants, against Scipio’s 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. These ancient totals are fragile, but the problem he presents is clear: Rome needs its Iberian allies to close the gap, while remembering that similar allies abandoned Scipio’s father and uncle.
Mago and Masinissa launch their cavalry against the Roman camp. Scipio has concealed an equal force below a rise; the attack is repulsed. Over the following days, both camps commit cavalry and light troops, then draw up their armies without fighting a general engagement.
Hasdrubal deploys late, with the Africans in the centre, the Iberians on the wings and the elephants in front of the flanks. Scipio normally answers with Romans and Italians in the centre and Iberian allies on the wings. The armies withdraw each evening: the routine concerns the time and order of battle. A repeated sham engagement goes beyond what the evidence supports.
Scipio has his men eat before dawn and immediately sends cavalry and velites to harass the enemy camp. Hasdrubal must deploy unfed in his usual order; when the lines form, the Romans and Italians now occupy the wings, while the Iberian allies advance slowly in the centre.
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Military history
XI.20–24, notamment 21 pour les contraintes romaines, 22 pour les ordres répétés, 23 pour le mouvement des ailes et 24 pour le non-engagement des centres
Reported troop strengths, reliance on Iberian allies, Mago and Masinissa’s attack, repeated deployments, meal and advance at dawn, reversal of contingents, different movement of centre and wings, elephants, uncommitted African centre, withdrawal and rain.
View ↗XXVIII.12–16, surtout 13–14 pour les sorties et le combat, 15–16 pour le camp, les désertions et la poursuite
Alternative totals, cavalry attack, days spent facing one another, the order of both armies, morning meal, prolonged skirmishing, movement of the wings, heat and hunger, orderly withdrawal followed by flight, rain, nocturnal evacuation of the camp, pursuit, about 6,000 men regrouping around Hasdrubal and the commanders’ flight to Gades.
View ↗Journal of Roman Studies 26 (1936), p. 19–23 ; extrait public consulté, surtout le résumé des indices topographiques
Cautious inventory and cartographic reconstruction of the only site clues supplied by Polybius and Livy—high ground, plain, camps and possible connection with the Baetis. Consultation was limited to the public excerpt. The full article lies beyond the documentary use made here.
View ↗University of Liverpool, thèse de doctorat (2016), p. 77 ; DOI 10.17638/03000526
State of the topographical uncertainty: traditional attribution near Alcalá del Río, the existence of several places called Ilipa, a competing eastern proposal and the absence of an archaeologically identified battlefield at Ilipa.
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