Battle
The counterattack against Kuroki fails while the Russian entrenchments still hold.
Military history
At Liaoyang, the Russians withstand Japanese frontal attacks, then abandon the city. Part of Kuroki’s army crossing north of the Taizi explains the paradox: Kouropatkin shifts corps to repel it, but his counterattack fails around Manjuyama and the Yentai mines. As his units tire, ammunition is rationed, and communications are threatened, he orders a withdrawal towards Mukden. Japan takes an important railway hub; the Russian army retains its ability to continue the war.
Liaoyang is at once the Russian military capital of southern Manchuria, a railway point and a position on the Taizi. The city therefore matters as both objective and junction: losing it exposes the retreat, but holding it too long may expose communications towards Mukden.
The Russians do not defend a single line. A forward position covers the southern and eastern approaches; the main position around Liaoyang then receives Zarubayev and the corps tasked with holding the city. Rain, rivers and kaoliang slow movement and make reinforcement difficult.
Oku and Nozu attack in the south while Kuroki crosses the Taizi to the east with part of his First Army. Kouropatkin keeps corps at Liaoyang and concentrates the rest against this bridgehead. The failure of the counterattack changes the Russian decision while the city still holds.
Japan takes the city but does not close the road to Mukden. The Russian army withdraws with its artillery; Japanese losses and fatigue limit the pursuit. Contemporary accounts of an imminent encirclement must be distinguished from this outcome.
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Military history
Vol.II, pp.229–238, notamment233–237 : concentration sur la rive droite, XVIIe corps, Manjuyama, Orloff et décision de retrait.
Russian orders of magnitude and disposition, resistance of the forward positions, crossing to the right bank of the Taizi, ammunition shortage, stated reasons for evacuation and condition of the retreat. Retrospective testimony by the Russian commander, therefore interested and incomplete regarding Japanese intentions.
View ↗PDF, pp. 1–8 et 11 ; OCR consulté lignes 31–81 sur le terrain et les trois lignes défensives, 143–189 sur le plan de Kouropatkine et le repli, 559–736 sur les attaques, l'évacuation et les ponts, 738–851 sur l'interprétation et les limites.
Institutional cross-check of the positions at An-shan-chan, Shou-Shan-pu, and Liaoyang, the attack sequence, withdrawal, and bridge demolitions. The 1931–1952 military study draws on campaign sources; its judgments on the defensive plan and command remain interpretations. Reference retained from the earlier dossier; the link returned an HTML page during review, and the PDF was not reread.
View ↗UCLA, 2018, PDF p. 18 ; passage de synthèse sur Liaoyang : premier grand conflit terrestre, surestimation russe des forces japonaises, artillerie russe répondant aux assauts, tentative d'encerclement d'Oyama et retraite réussie de Kouropatkine après l'épuisement japonais.
Academic cross-check of the relationship among successive attacks, defence in depth, attempted encirclement and Russian retreat. This dissertation chiefly studies apocalyptic narratives and war reporting; it serves here as a secondary synthesis, not topographical proof.
View ↗Page d'archive datée du 4 septembre 1904 : traduction d'un article du Times daté du 31 août, sous le titre Battle of Liaoyang, ref. A03023691200. Le compte rendu de presse donne des dates et un récit de situation à confronter aux rapports militaires.
Institutional contemporary witness to the circulation of information and battle names. Press figures and chronology are not treated as sufficient evidence against operational reports.
View ↗Article HTML, passage de la notice sur l'histoire officielle d'Oyama, paragraphes 126–129 : coordination de Kuroki, Oku et Nozu, défense russe derrière des ouvrages et retraite de Kouropatkine sans perte catastrophique.
Contemporary cross-check of a professional reading: Japanese victory and Russian retreat, but no complete rout. This is a review, not the full Japanese report.
View ↗PDF, p. 2, lignes 56–79 : avance japonaise en Mandchourie, victoire de Liaoyang contre une armée russe plus nombreuse, pertes supérieures japonaises selon cette synthèse et portée de la campagne.
Operational and strategic framework. The synthesis is not used to place formations at the local scale.
View ↗Page 2, OCR lignes 34–80 sur Oku, Nozu, Kuroki et les pertes incertaines ; lignes 81–118 sur le franchissement de la Tai-Tse ; lignes 228–260 sur le lien entre le passage de Kuroki et la décision russe. Compte rendu de presse à confronter aux récits d'opérations.
Contradictory check of circulating contemporary narratives about the crossing, alleged encirclement and losses. Used to document the dispute, distinct from serving as the sole basis for positions.
View ↗History of Europe, p.358 ; plan examiné intégralement.
Taizi bend, railway, town, corps and Kuroki’s axis; distances are schematic.
View ↗Résumé de campagne, 26 août–4 septembre ; références A03023691400 et C09050769600.
Cross-check on the outcome without encirclement and Russian resistance; scans of the reports have not been reread.
View ↗Aperçu, pp.5 et9 : photographies et notices de tenues japonaises et de fusiliers sibériens.
Summer silhouettes from 1904; Japanese uniforms still include both blue and khaki, while the Russian uniform is light with a dark cap. The Liaoyang chapter is outside the preview.
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