Battle
From the gamble on breakthrough to organised attrition
Military history
The Somme did not begin with the men leaving their trenches on 1 July. It arose from a Franco-British plan for breakthrough devised before Verdun, then reduced and accelerated by the French haemorrhage there. A week of fire was to destroy wire, dugouts and artillery; its effect nevertheless varied sharply with gun density, shell quality, terrain and the depth of the works. In the north, British units advanced towards defences still in action; in the south, the British and French took several objectives. For four months, each side committed reserves, altered its methods and turned villages, ridges and woods into successive strongpoints. Tactical learning occurred, but it did not convert these gains into an operational breakthrough.
At Chantilly in December 1915, the Allies planned coordinated offensives for 1916. The Somme was to unite a large French force with a still-growing British army. Verdun then absorbed French divisions and artillery: the British sector widened, while Joffre rejected a long postponement because the battle also had to loosen the grip on the Meuse.
Haig retained the prospect of a deep breakthrough; Rawlinson favoured a more limited advance under artillery protection. The compromise combined extensive objectives with a massive bombardment without everywhere resolving the relationship between prior destruction, infantry speed and the arrival of reserves.
North of the Albert–Bapaume road, deep works, slopes and wire still intact favoured the German defence. Farther south, British artillery was denser; before the French Sixth Army, the preparation was more concentrated still and German fortifications less developed. A single assault time therefore produced several battles.
The Allies progressively narrowed their objectives and better coordinated artillery, aircraft and infantry. The Germans abandoned some of the overconcentration in the front line, multiplied shell-hole positions, strongpoints, immediate counterattacks and depth. Each side learned under fire; neither had enough time, surprise and fresh reserves to impose the tempo alone.
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Military history
Chapitre VIII, « The Plan of the Somme Offensive », p. 219–242 ; surtout p. 219–221 sur Chantilly et le projet franco-britannique, p. 227–228 sur Verdun, le report souhaité par Haig et le refus de Joffre
Genesis of the plan, initial division of roles, Verdun's effect on the timetable and disagreement over the offensive's depth.
View ↗Australian War Memorial Transcribe, lignes 218–253 pour le document et le commandement du XIVe Reserve-Korps ; lignes 305–330 pour les trois tranchées, fils et abris ; lignes 479–506 pour communications et abris de batteries ; lignes 620–731 pour la dépense de munitions et les communications vers Bapaume ; lignes 784–802 pour l’aviation et sa coopération avec l’artillerie
German command perspective, arrival of reinforcements, communications difficulties and defensive lessons formulated during the war.
View ↗Sections « ATTAQUER POUR ROMPRE LE FRONT », « LES BRITANNIQUES PRÉPARENT L’OFFENSIVE », « LA PARTICIPATION FRANÇAISE À LA BATAILLE », « L’ARMÉE ALLEMANDE SUR LA SOMME », « L’ÉCHEC DE L’ASSAUT DU 1ER JUILLET » et « LE BILAN HUMAIN ET STRATÉGIQUE DE L’ATTAQUE »
Inter-Allied plan, Verdun, distribution of artillery and fronts, Franco-British differences, chronology and exact breakdown of British first-day casualties.
View ↗PDF p. 1–3, pagination de revue p. 13–15 ; passage sur l’emploi de 32 chars le 15 septembre, leurs pannes et destructions, puis paragraphe sur les pluies d’automne et l’arrêt des opérations
First tanks, technical limitations, autumn mud and the French assessment of the battle's duration.
View ↗1914-1918-Online, PDF p. 1–3 ; p. 1 sur plan, 1 537 pièces, plus de 1,5 million d’obus et résultats du 1er juillet ; p. 2 sur Flaucourt, Bazentin, Pozières, Flers-Courcelette, Thiepval et l’Ancre ; p. 2–3 sur pertes et portée stratégique
Overall chronology, sectoral effects, French first-day casualties, division rotations, national totals and debate over the result.
View ↗Journal of Strategic Studies 35/6 (2012), PDF p. 7–12 ; p. 7–8 sur divisions engagées et environ 430 000 pertes allemandes issues des rapports ; p. 8–9 sur doctrine de première ligne et armes combinées alliées ; p. 10–12 sur Trichterstellung, mitrailleuses, profondeur, Gegenstoß et Gegenangriff
German adaptation during the Somme, horizontal diffusion of practices, defence in depth and scope of the German casualty assessment.
View ↗LeMO : chapeau introductif, puis paragraphes ouverts par « Planungen für eine Offensive an der Somme », « Jeder Soldat war schwer beladen », « Mit einer zweiten Angriffswelle » et « Als die Operation Ende 1916 »
German framing of the first day, number of divisions in the initial assault, depth of the works and territorial outcome.
View ↗Paragraphes sous le chapeau, notamment le bilan de plus de 57 000 pertes et 19 240 morts, les sept jours de bombardement, les projectiles défectueux et les réseaux ou points d’appui demeurés intacts
British casualties on 1 July and material limits of the artillery preparation.
View ↗Paragraphes « The Battle of the Somme » : catastrophe du premier jour, gain final d’environ six miles, chars insuffisants et peu fiables, apprentissage tactique et estimations globales de pertes
Territorial significance, limits of tanks, tactical evolution and cautious comparison of human losses.
View ↗Paragraphes sur le 1er juillet, la défense allemande et surtout la section Pozières, 23 juillet–3 septembre, avec plus de 24 000 pertes australiennes dont 6 741 morts
Scope and cost of the Pozières fighting, role of Australian forces and continuity between July and September.
View ↗Atlas of the World War, carte 13 ; fichier officiel WWOne13-01.jpg. Lire le front initial, les axes Albert–Bapaume et Somme–Péronne, puis les lignes de progression datées jusqu’au 19 novembre
Place names, orientation of the axes, relative depth of gains and general geometry of the teaching map.
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