Battle
Strip the north · strike the wings · close the routes
Military history
After Gumbinnen, the German Eighth Army withdrew, and its new command still did not know whether the Russian First Army would continue westward or turn south. Samsonov's Second Army advanced south of the Masurian Lakes, urged on by the front command despite already deteriorating communications and supply. Between 23 and 27 August, the Germans took the risk of leaving only a screen before Rennenkampf, moved their corps by rail and road, then struck the two Russian wings separately. The Russian centre continued towards Allenstein without a reliable picture of its flanks. The ensuing closure destroyed the coherence of the Second Army, but neither the Russian First Army nor the empire's strategic capacity disappeared at Tannenberg.
The Northwestern Front was to bring together Rennenkampf's First Army from the north-east and Samsonov's Second Army from the south. The Masurian Lakes separated their axes. On 26 August, Zhilinsky also directed two corps of the First Army towards Königsberg: just when Samsonov needed it to pin the Eighth Army, part of the northern force received another mission.
On 23 August, Samsonov requested a pause to restore order to his services; Zhilinsky refused. The corps marched on sandy roads, with intermittent communications and supply columns unable to keep pace. Walsh describes less an army manoeuvring as a single body than five neighbouring tactical groups whose commanders received a common picture of the situation only belatedly.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff resumed a manoeuvre already initiated by the Eighth Army staff: I Corps travelled by rail towards Deutsch Eylau, while XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps wheeled south. Only mounted and screening elements remained before Rennenkampf. Unencrypted Russian messages reinforced the German assessment, but no intercepted order guaranteed that the First Army would remain slow.
German XX Corps contained the Russian centre around Hohenstein. On 26 August, Mackensen drove VI Corps back at Bischofsburg; on the 27th, François and the right wing of XX Corps drove Russian I Corps from Usdau. The advanced XIII and XV Corps were then engaged to the north while their exit routes towards Neidenburg and Willenberg became the objectives of the German wings.
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Military history
British Journal for Military History, 2.2 (2016), p. 59–88 ; surtout p. 75–78 (PDF p. 16–19) sur les ordres de Jilinski, les cinq corps, la logistique, les interceptions et la contre-attaque ; p. 83 (PDF p. 24) sur la révision stratégique
Perspective of the Russian command, cooperation between the two armies, communications and supply, chronology of 26–30 August, Russian losses and strategic limits of the German success.
View ↗Chapitre « Tannenberg », p. 44–58 ; surtout p. 46–50 sur le changement de plan, le risque Rennenkampf et le message intercepté, p. 51–55 sur Bischofsburg, Usdau, Waplitz et la fermeture, p. 56–57 sur Muschaken, Samsonov et le choix du nom
Intentions claimed by the German chief of staff, corps movements, uncertainties felt at headquarters, local crises and the construction of memory; testimony cross-checked rather than treated as neutral.
View ↗German History in Documents and Images : abstract, premier paragraphe pour les pertes de synthèse ; transcription du message, paragraphes 1–2 pour cinq corps vaincus, plus de 90 000 prisonniers et la poursuite annoncée
Outcome proclaimed immediately after the battle, order of magnitude of captives, German losses given by the editor, and immediate transformation of success into a public narrative.
View ↗1914-1918-Online, version 1.1, sections « The Defeat of General Samsonov’s Army » et « The Mythologising of the Battle of Allenstein », PDF p. 1–2, notamment les paragraphes sur 26–30 août, environ 120 000 pertes dont 95 000 captifs, portée stratégique et « Second Cannae »
Synthesis of Russian losses, the result's non-decisive character at front scale, persistence of the First Army and political creation of the Tannenberg myth.
View ↗LeMO, chapeau introductif sous le titre : 8e armée donnée à 150 000 hommes, offensive vers la 2e armée autour d’Allenstein et encerclement du 26 au 31 août
Order of magnitude of the Eighth Army and the German institutional framing of the battle around Allenstein.
View ↗Carte 25 de l’atlas WWI ; fichier officiel WWOne25.jpg. Lire la situation du 23 août : 1re armée russe au nord-est, 2e armée au sud, 8e armée et réseau ferré est-prussien.
Initial situation, separation of the two Russian armies, screen before Rennenkampf and transfer of German I Corps.
View ↗Carte 26 de l’atlas WWI ; fichier officiel WWOne26.jpg. Lire la situation du soir du 26 août : combats autour de Bischofsburg, Allenstein, Hohenstein et concentration du Ier corps devant Usdau.
Relative positions at the start of the fighting on the wings, advance of the Russian centre and German axes before the closure.
View ↗Carte 27 de l’atlas WWI ; fichier officiel WWOne27-01.jpg. Lire la situation du soir du 30 août : ailes allemandes rabattues, corps russes disloqués et routes méridionales contrôlées.
Closure through Neidenburg, Willenberg and Passenheim, final geometry of the pocket and distinction between operational encirclement and a continuous circle.
View ↗p. 1–5 : commandement de la 8e armée p. 1 ; Ier corps p. 1–2 ; XVIIe et XXe corps p. 2–3 ; Ier corps de réserve p. 3–4 ; divisions indépendantes, Landwehr et 1re division de cavalerie p. 4–5
Names of corps commanders and composition of the major German formations actually available in the battle.
View ↗p. 1–2 pour la 1re armée et ses corps ; p. 2–4 pour la 2e armée, du Ier au XXIIIe corps, trois divisions de cavalerie et troupes d’armée
Order of battle of the two Russian armies, assignment of corps and commanders, and distinction between Rennenkampf's force and Samsonov's five corps.
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