Battle
Hold an airfield while contesting every supply route
Military history
Watchtower opened two distinct amphibious battles: on Guadalcanal, the Marines landed with almost no immediate opposition and gained the Lunga airfield; on Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo, the Japanese defenders resisted from fortified island positions. Taking Henderson Field therefore ended nothing. It created an objective that both sides had to supply and protect for six months. This map deliberately compresses an air-land-sea campaign. It follows sectors, axes and supply windows, which must be distinguished from a continuous front line across Guadalcanal. Each symbol represents a different grouping in each phase, clearly described on its card.
X-Ray Group came ashore on Guadalcanal's north coast at Red Beach and advanced towards Lunga with almost no immediate opposition. Yoke Group separately attacked Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo, where Japanese naval units fought from ridges, ravines and cavities. The two operations shared a fleet, but must not be mistaken for the same land battle.
After taking the airfield, Vandegrift organised coastal positions and strongpoints around Lunga. The official monograph specifies that troop numbers did not permit a continuous inland line: patrols, outposts, rivers and ridges covered the approaches.
Japan could bring men in quickly by destroyer, but had difficulty delivering the heavy artillery, vehicles, food and ammunition needed for a sustained offensive. The October and November convoys therefore sought to neutralise Henderson before unloading. Tactical success at sea mattered only if the cargo reached the units ashore.
Tenaru and Edson's Ridge preserved the airfield; the Americal Division's 164th Infantry landed on 13 October and fought alongside the Marines during the next offensive; Cape Esperance did not prevent the Japanese convoy from passing; in November, surface actions and air strikes shattered the large convoy. Relief of the 1st Marine Division by Army formations then prolonged the effort until Ke. The decision came from this chain, not from any isolated duel.
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Military history
Phase II, pp. 1–2 et 6–15 (feuillets PDF 17–18 et 22–31) : H-hour Tulagi à 0800, Zero Hour Guadalcanal à 0910, résistance distincte, Beach Red, prise de l'aérodrome, congestion du déchargement et dispositions défensives du 9 août.
Establishing from Vandegrift's report the separation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal, the Red Beach–airfield sequence and the initial logistical vulnerability.
View ↗Ch. III, pp. 59–81 (invasion) ; ch. IV, pp. 82–104, surtout pp. 87–89 et 95–98 (périmètre non continu, Tenaru) ; ch. V, pp. 105–134, surtout pp. 110–119 (Edson) ; ch. VI, pp. 135–169, surtout pp. 146–166 (Cape Esperance, arrivée du 164th Infantry et offensive d'octobre) ; ch. VII, pp. 170–189 (novembre) ; ch. IX, pp. 210–219 (relève Vandegrift–Patch, Americal et XIV Corps) ; ch. XV, pp. 336–350 (Ke, fin et bilans).
Fixing the chronology, topography, successive orders of battle, arrival and relief of Army formations, land axes, naval articulation and limits of the estimates.
View ↗Map IV, Guadalcanal and Florida Islands ; Map V, Landing and Capture of the Airfield ; Map VI, Bloody Ridge ; Map VII, Japanese Counteroffensive, 23–26 October ; Map XXI, Final Phase, 26 January–9 February. Contrôle visuel nord en haut et relations Tulagi–Lunga–Tenaru–cap Espérance.
Checking orientation, the north coast, the Ilu to the east, Edson's Ridge to the south, the two October axes and the final withdrawal towards Cape Esperance.
View ↗pp. 4–10 (groupes X-Ray/Yoke et débarquements distincts) ; pp. 11–18 (Savo, Henderson, Tenaru) ; pp. 23–27 (Edson's Ridge) ; pp. 32–38 (Cape Esperance, arrivée du 164th Infantry et offensive d'octobre) ; pp. 43–46 (bataille navale de novembre, arrivée de l'Americal et relève Vandegrift–Patch) ; pp. 49–51 (XIV Corps, repli, trois nuits Ke et pertes terrestres américaines).
Cross-checking the Marine level, the two amphibious groups, land battles, the joint-service composition of Cactus Air, arrival of the Army, relief and end of the campaign.
View ↗Introduction pp. 1–2 ; organisation et instructions pp. 2–3 ; mouvements préliminaires et approche pp. 4–11 ; engagement pp. 12–18 ; conclusions pp. 19–20 ; chronologie pp. 24–27 ; track chart p. xi. Publication ONI originale de 1943, réédition Naval Historical Center.
Reconstructing the night route towards Cape Esperance, the bombardment mission and Scott's force's action, while checking its operational effect against Miller and the NIDS.
View ↗Part I, pp. 1–36 (plan, attaques aériennes et combat de croiseurs) ; Part II, pp. 37–59, surtout pp. 41–58 (Hiei, attaques sur les onze transports) ; Part III, pp. 60–79 (combat de cuirassés) ; épilogue p. 80 ; cartes pp. 25, 47 et 63. Publication ONI de 1944.
Establishing the maritime and aerial sequence in November without treating contemporary enemy estimates as definitive.
View ↗Security & Strategy, vol. 4, janvier 2024, pp. imprimées 109–112 / PDF 1–4 (structure Rabaul–Shortland–Guadalcanal et carte), 116–120 / PDF 8–12 (convoi d'octobre, bombardement et distribution), 122–124 / PDF 14–16 (grand convoi et bataille navale de novembre), 124–130 / PDF 16–22 (transports par destroyers et sous-marins, distribution manuelle, survie et conclusion).
Restoring the Japanese perspective on the three major convoys, transport throughput, bottlenecks ashore and the transition from offensive action to survival.
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