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Battle

Battle of Leyte Gulf

23 — 26 October 1944

Disperse · lure · delay · fail

Military history

How did the Japanese convergence operation fail after achieving surprise off Samar?

To attack the Leyte transports, the Japanese must bring several squadrons together through the archipelago. US submarines and aircraft weaken Kurita without stopping him. Ozawa draws Halsey north, leaving San Bernardino open. But Nishimura is broken at Surigao, and the resistance of the escort carriers and their screens at Samar prevents the Japanese surprise from becoming an attack on the landing force.

A naval plan under constraint

Preliminary American operations in the approaches to Leyte allow the Japanese command to confirm the objective and activate Shō-Gō No. 1 on 18 October, two days before the main landings on the 20th. The translated Japanese monograph describes a decisive battle in the Philippines, but also incomplete air forces and preparations: the plan must converge forces from the south, center and north when communications and air support are already fragile.

The sea separates the engagements

Palawan, the Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, San Bernardino Strait, Samar and Cape Engaño do not form a single line. Straits channel night navigation; the archipelago separates commands; maritime depth makes local surprise possible but costs time to any force that must return toward the Leyte transports.

The causal chain

The Palawan torpedoes and Sibuyan air strikes weaken Kurita without destroying his force. Halsey’s move north towards Ozawa leaves San Bernardino uncovered. Surigao breaks the southern force while Kurita passes to the north. At Samar, US screens and aircraft disrupt the pursuit; the Japanese decision to withdraw follows without an attack on the transports.

What the numbers risk concealing

The ships involved change with each action: Taffy 3's six escort carriers, three destroyers and four destroyer escorts are not a land equivalent of the Center Force. Totals of ships sunk differ according to cutoff date and categories. The narrative therefore separates documented facts, reconstruction of axes and interpretive disputes.

Military history

Sources

Official history or institutional archiveNaval History and Heritage Command — Battle of Leyte Gulf

Overview, paragraphes commençant par « On 15 October », « The First Mobile Fleet’s Main Body » et « Meanwhile », puis paragraphe conclusif sur la défaite de Shō-Gō ; dates, quatre engagements, force nord, Surigao et effet stratégique.

Operational chronology, activation of Shō-Gō, roles of the Northern/Southern/Center Forces, Surigao and strategic reach.

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Official history or institutional archiveNHHC H-Gram 038 — H-038-2, Leyte Gulf in Detail

Sections « Battle of Surigao Strait », « Battle off Samar » et « Cape Engaño » ; passage du 25 octobre à 0700 sur l'attaque de Taffy 3 et passage de 0800 sur les messages de Kinkaid à Halsey ; bibliographie finale.

Detailed sequence of actions, Taffy 3's composition, requests for aid and articulation of the four engagements.

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Official synthesis dossierNHHC H-Gram 038 — Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944

H-Gram 038, 25 novembre 2019, pièces « H-038-1 Synopsis » et « H-038-2 Detail » ; sections sur Palawan, Sibuyan, Surigao, Samar et Cape Engaño.

Institutional cross-check of chronology, losses and the link between Taffy 3 and the operation as a whole.

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Official history or institutional archiveNHHC — Calmness, Courage, and Efficiency: Remembering the Battle of Leyte Gulf

Sections « I Have Returned », « Strike, Repeat, Strike! », « Make All Ready for a Night Battle », « Where is Task Force 34? » et « In Harm’s Way: Battle off Samar ».

Landing context, effects of the Sibuyan air strikes, decision around TF 34, Surigao and Samar.

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Official publication referencing action reportsNHHC — Calmness, Courage, and Efficiency: Battle of Leyte Gulf

PDF publication 508, pp. 37–57 : « Make All Ready for a Night Battle » pour Surigao, pp. 48–50 pour la décision de Halsey et TF 34, pp. 56–57 pour Cape Engaño ; références aux rapports d'action Third Fleet RG 38, NARA 4–5, et Destroyer Squadron 56, NARA 7.

Surigao gunfire, naval losses, Halsey's decision and explicit references to action reports held by the U.S. National Archives.

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Institutional naval history, ship historyNaval History and Heritage Command — USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413), DANFS

Sections « Leyte Operation, 19 October 1944 » et « Battle off Samar, 25 October 1944 » : attaque de Darter/Dace, composition de la force centrale et découverte de Taffy 3 à 0637.

Composition of the Center Force at contact and documented course of Samar from an official ship history.

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Translated Japanese source, institutional military archiveJapanese Monograph No. 45 — History of Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section

HyperWar, pp. imprimées 215–220, section « Conduct of SHO-GO Operation, No. 1 » : ordre du soir du 18 octobre, débarquement du 20, coordination air-mer, préparatifs à 50–60 % et conséquences de l'échec.

Japanese perspective on orders, objectives, air and transport constraints, and the consequences of Shō-Gō's failure.

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Commander's testimony and later specialist accountWilliam F. Halsey — The Battle for Leyte Gulf, Proceedings, May 1952

Passages ouvrant par « There were two U.S. Fleets », « I had three alternatives » et « The Japanese were divided into three forces » ; série des messages de Kinkaid entre 06 h 48 et 10 h 00, ordre d'envoyer TF 34 et TG 38.2 vers le sud, puis bilan des navires.

Halsey's testimony on available information, his decision and retrospective limits; cross-checked against institutional sources.

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Specialist review of archive-based workDavid Sears — recension de Storm over Leyte de John Prados, Naval History

Rubrique « Storm over Leyte: The Philippine Invasion and the Destruction of the Japanese Navy », recension signée David Sears ; passages ouvrant par « Chief among the legends » et « Prados thinks that better communications » sur JICPOA/FRUPAC, Shō-Gō et les alternatives de Halsey.

Specialist interpretation focused on intelligence and alternative decisions; used as debate, not as sole proof of movement.

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Institutional archive and historical cartographyInterrogations of Japanese Officials, Vol. I — Leyte Gulf plates

Online Reading Room, Nav No. 9 : organisation de la bataille du golfe de Leyte p. 35 ; attaque sous-marine contre la Seconde flotte le 23 octobre p. 37 ; disposition de la Seconde flotte au contact le 25 octobre p. 40.

Institutional check of axes, straits and relationships among the Center, Southern and Northern Forces; grouped at operational scale without invented coordinates.

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Official campaign report and operational mapGeneral Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area — Campaigns of MacArthur, Volume I, Chapter VIII, Plate No. 60, Battle for Leyte Gulf

Chapitre VIII, pp. 209–210, Plate No. 60, puis pp. 214–222 : routes de la force centrale par Sibuyan et San Bernardino, de la force sud par Surigao, d'Ozawa au nord et de la Troisième flotte à l'est.

Central check of the topology of Luzon, Samar, Leyte, Sibuyan, San Bernardino and Surigao, and the operational axes.

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Official strategic-scope dossierNHHC H-Gram 040 — Leyte Gulf and the Philippines

H-040-2, passages sur l'issue navale du 24–25 octobre et la poursuite de la campagne terrestre de Leyte ; distinction entre victoire navale et opérations des deux mois suivants.

Bounding the immediate consequence: the naval battle does not end the land campaign or include later kamikaze losses.

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Contemporary reports by US commandersUS Navy — Battle Experience, Leyte Gulf, CTU 77.4.3 et CTU 77.4.2

CTU 77.4.3, paragraphes 4, 6, 10, 13 et 21, pp. 78-26–29 : lancement, routes et écran ; paragraphe 24, pp. 78-29–30 : St. Lo. CTU 77.4.2, paragraphes 3–8, pp. 78-30–31 : appui de Taffy 2.

Movements and actions reported during the battle, without treating damage claims as confirmed losses.

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Official history of the Army Air ForcesCraven et Cate — The Army Air Forces in World War II, volume V, chapitre 12

Page imprimée 364, passage « Although the number of American planes » : regroupement à 09 h 11 puis changement de décision vers 12 h 36.

Distinguishes the break in the pursuit at Samar, regrouping, and the later abandonment of the Leyte objective.

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Institutional visual referenceNHHC — USS Gambier Bay, photographie NH 79408

Photographie NH 79408, avril 1944, entière examinée via la reproduction HyperWar.

Hull, flight deck and island of a Casablanca-class carrier; livery and aircraft in the drawing are reconstructed.

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Institutional visual referenceNHHC — USS Johnston, photographie NH 63495

NH 63495, 27 octobre 1943, photographie entière examinée via HyperWar.

Fletcher silhouette, five single main mounts, two funnels and torpedo tubes. No claim that the Johnston’s livery at Leyte is shown.

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Institutional visual referenceDepartment of Defense / NARA — Yamato en mer de Sibuyan

Photographie 80-G-325952, 24 octobre 1944, entière examinée en haute définition.

1944 silhouette, three main turrets and central secondary armament; smaller mounts simplified.

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Institutional visual referenceNHHC — Avenger au-dessus de Tacloban, 80-G-288932

Photographie du 20 octobre 1944, entière examinée.

Avenger silhouette in the Leyte theatre; TBF/TBM family drawing with reconstructed colours.

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Edited by BattlesInMotion.com