Battle

Imphal–Kohima

8 March – 18 July 1944

Two sieges linked by a road become a battle of supply.

Military history

How do two nearly encircled positions hold long enough to turn an offensive into a logistical defeat?

The Japanese cut the roads to Imphal and besieged Kohima to stop relief from Dimapur. But the Allies held the plain’s airfields and could endure with air supply. Relief at Kohima in April did not reopen the route; fighting continued until the junction on 22 June. Meanwhile, losses, hunger and the monsoon exhausted the Japanese columns.

Two linked objectives

Imphal concentrates IV Corps, the airfields, and the depots of the Manipur plain; Kohima commands the road to Dimapur and Assam. Taking Kohima is therefore intended to prevent the relief of Imphal, while taking Imphal is meant to provide the stocks needed to continue the offensive.

Two ways to hold

A cut road did not automatically dictate retreat. At Imphal, airfields allowed a concentrated defense to be supplied. At Kohima, the tiny perimeter made parachute drops difficult: holding on until land relief remained essential.

An offensive on credit

U-Go assumes a rapid breakthrough, capture of Allied resources, and advance through terrain in which artillery, vehicles, and food move badly. Once the depots remain uncaptured and the monsoon sets in, each day of siege increases the Japanese deficit.

Explore

Chronological dossier

Battle · 12 — 15 May 1940Sedan BreakthroughHow did concentrated air power and the Meuse crossing produce a breakthrough faster than the French command could contain it?Battle · 11 — 12 November 1940TarantoTwo waves of Swordfish strike Taranto: three Italian battleships are put out of action, while three others remain intact.Battle · 26 May — 21 June 1942GazalaThe Axis restores its supply behind the minefield, breaks the British counterattacks and then isolates Tobruk.Battle · 4 — 7 June 1942MidwayIntelligence positions the ambush; dispersed attacks disorganise the defence before the dive-bombers arrive.Battle · 17 July 1942 — 2 February 1943StalingradUrban combat, stretched fronts and a flank offensive turn a conquest into an encirclement.Battle · 7 August 1942 — 9 February 1943Guadalcanal CampaignHow did possession of an airfield impose a combined battle of supply, naval attrition and ground combat?Battle · 23 October — 11 November 1942Second Battle of El AlameinHow did Montgomery turn logistical superiority into a breakthrough despite the depth of the Axis minefields?Battle · 19 — 25 February 1943KasserineAxis forces break through American positions in the passes before Allied reinforcements stabilize the front.

Military history

Sources

Post-war operational history based on archives and testimonyHeadquarters, United States Army, Japan, Burma Operations Record: 15th Army Operations in Imphal Area and Withdrawal to Northern Burma, Japanese Monograph No. 134

Pages imprimées 129–133, 137–143 et 150–157 : combats, retrait du 31 mai, arrière-garde de Miyazaki, ordres successifs de retrait en juillet. PDF = pagination imprimée +14.

Japanese plan, organisation, logic of Operation U-Go, failure of the advance, and withdrawal; used with caution because this is a later account based on files and officers' recollections.

View ↗

Institutional overviewNational Army Museum, Battles of Imphal and Kohima

Sections Japanese offensive, Armies and commanders, Kohima surrounded, Reinforcements, Relief of Imphal, Logistics, Casualties et Consequences : objectifs, commandements, dates du secours, pont aérien, pertes et effets stratégiques.

Operational framework, named formations, air supply, opening of the road on 22 June, orders of magnitude for the forces, and consequences.

View ↗

Institutional synthesis and battlefield mappingRoyal Armouries, The Battles of Imphal and Kohima, 1944

Sections Defence of Sangshak and Jessami, Battle of Kohima, The Battle of Imphal et The End of Operation U-Go ; synthèse du déroulement et des pertes.

Delaying actions, Kohima's relief, sectors of the Imphal plain, and local topographical references.

View ↗

Digitised contemporary source and archival recordJapan Center for Asian Historical Records, timeline entry: Japanese forces began their advance on Imphal, 8 March 1944

Notice du 8 mars 1944 : objectif de couper la route de ravitaillement alliée vers la Chine, coopération avec l’INA, documents contemporains Shashin Shuho nos. 315, 317 et 323, et mention du rôle de l’insuffisance des approvisionnements dans l’échec.

Objectives declared in contemporary Japanese propaganda and archives; claims of victory are checked against operational and Allied accounts.

View ↗

Institutional cartographic sourceNational Army Museum, Map of India and Burma, 1944

Carte de théâtre associée au dossier Battles of Imphal and Kohima ; utilisée pour contrôler la relation spatiale entre Dimapur, Kohima, Imphal et la frontière birmane, sans reprendre sa géométrie comme une mesure exacte.

Scale and orientation of the operational map, relationship between the two focal points, and the Dimapur–Kohima–Imphal axis.

View ↗

U.S. official history and operational mapRomanus et Sunderland — Stilwell’s Command Problems, chapitre V, carte 10

Pages 172–175 et 192–194, carte 10 p.173 entière examinée : axes japonais, hauteurs, plaine, route et contraintes du transport aérien.

Geography, Allied concentration, supply and limits of air transport. Geometry is reconstructed, not traced from coordinates.

View ↗

British official historyRoyal Air Force 1939–1945, volume III, chapitre XV — Arakan, Kohima and Imphal

Pages 323–329, notamment relève de Kohima p.327 ; jonction des 2e division britannique et 5e division indienne pp.339–340.

Air supply, distinction between relief and relief-in-place, and the land junction on 22 June.

View ↗

Primary visual referenceNational Army Museum — Gurkhas à Scraggy, 1944

Photographies entières « Members of the 10th Gurkha Rifles resting after the capture of Scraggy hill » et NAM 1998-01-154-6, secteur Imphal–Kohima.

Silhouette, hat, clothing and equipment of infantrymen in the sector; colors and pose reconstructed.

View ↗

Primary visual referenceIWM — M3 Lee au nord d’Imphal, IND 3468

No.9 Army Film and Photographic Unit, IND 3468, photographie entière examinée.

Riveted hull, hull gun and small Lee turret; does not claim to identify this vehicle as a specific Nungshigum tank.

View ↗

Primary visual referenceAustralian War Memorial — Dakota FL578 à Imphal, P02491.116

P02491.116, vers mars 1944, chargement d’un canon de 25 livres ; photographie entière. Recoupement NAM : C47 larguant à Palel, 1944.

Large cargo door, silhouette and theater markings. The photograph does not show the whole aircraft; proportions supplemented by the NAM view and type reconstruction.

View ↗

Primary visual referenceWar Department — Soldier’s Guide to the Japanese Army, Special Series 27

15 novembre 1944, p.26 figure14 (uniforme M98), p.32 figure20 (tenues tropicales), p.52 figure38 (Type99, fusil inférieur). Pages entières examinées.

General contemporary Japanese equipment; these plates do not document an individual soldier or uniform issue at Imphal.

View ↗

Institutional regimental historyRoyal Scots Dragoon Guards — Nunshigum and the Burma Campaign

Paragraphe consacré à avril 1944 : B Squadron du 3rd Carabiniers, 1st Dogras, progression des chars sur la pente et prise de la crête.

Identification of the tank regiment and its cooperation with infantry at Nungshigum.

View ↗

Specialist historical studyBritish Military History — Brigadier B. C. H. Gerty

Édition du 12 avril 2024, p.16 : attaque Dogras–Carabiniers du 13 avril, contre-attaques et évacuation japonaise constatée le 15.

Nungshigum chronology checked against the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards regimental history.

View ↗

Edited by BattlesInMotion.comEditorial corpus updated on October 1, 2026